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REMOVAL FROM STATE TO FEDERAL COURT: THE
VOLUNTARY-INVOLUNTARY RULE-SELF v. GENERAL
MOTORS CORPORAT2ION
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Self v. GeneralMotors Corp.,I the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed the issue of continued adherence to the judicially developed
"voluntary-involuntary" rule,2 a rule which is applied in determining
the propriety of removal of a case to federal court following the dismissal of a resident defendant. 3 The court affirmed the validity of the rule.
The purpose of this note is to examine the consequences of judicial
adherence to the rule and to explore the possibility that the Ninth Circuit could have more effectively reconciled the competing policies
which underlie removal controversies4 through a less rigid application
of the voluntary-involuntary rule.
1. No. 75-1572 (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 1978).
2. District courts are given original jurisdiction to hear civil actions in which the "matter
U.S.C. § 1441 (1976), on the basis of diversity under id § 1332. District courts are given
original jurisdiction to hear civil actions in which the "matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and is between citizens of different
States." Id § 1332.
A suit "brought in a State court of which the district courts ... have original jurisdiction,
may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court ... where such
action is pending." Id § 1441(a).
3. The term "resident defendant" will be used herein to denote a defendant who is a
citizen of the same state as the plaintiff. The term "diverse defendant" will describe a defendant who is a citizen of a state other than the plaintiffs.
4. Any question of removal raises two competing policy considerations. On the one hand,
there is the developing trend toward restricting federal jurisdiction. See Bradley v. Maryland Cas. Co., 382 F.2d 415, 419 (8th Cir. 1967) (Blackmun, J.) (recognizing trend to restrict
but stating such "pronouncements [of trend] are not absolute"); Shamrock Oil Corp. v.
Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 107 (1941) (discussing congressional intent to restrict federal jurisdiction by statutory change which allows only defendants to remove); Ennis v. Queen Ins. Co.
of America, 364 F. Supp. 964, 966 (W.D. Tenn. 1973) (recognizing trend to restrict and
applying the voluntary-involuntary rule to deny removal); Young Spring & Wire Corp. v.
American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 220 F. Supp. 222, 228 (W.D. Mo. 1963) (discussing congressional intent to restrict diversity jurisdiction and practical reasons which have led courts
to strictly construe statutes to avoid federal jurisdiction). See generally Note, Removal of
Suits to FederalCourts afterthe Statutory Deadline:An OldFormulaRe-examined, 60 HARV.
L. REv. 959 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Removal of Suits].
On the other hand, there is a recognition by the courts that the federal removal statutes
are expressly designed to afford defendants access to a federal forum and to prevent the
fraudulent avoidance of federal jurisdiction. Id. at 965. See Beckman v. Graves, 360 F.2d
148, 149 (10th Cir. 1966) (where original jurisdiction lies in federal court, removal is a statutory right unless specifically prohibited by act of Congress).
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FACTS OF THE CASE

Plaintiff Christine Smith, a California citizen, sued General Motors
Corporation (GMC), a citizen of Michigan and Delaware, and Vern
Prior, a citizen of California, for injuries sustained in an automobile
accident. The suit was filed in a California Superior Court. On the
basis of a covenant not to execute judgment given to Prior by plaintiff,5
GMC attempted to remove the case to federal court, arguing that Prior
was no longer a real party in interest and that his joinder was, therefore, fraudulent. The district court remanded, stating that the joinder
was not fraudulent6 and that despite the covenant, Prior was still a
party to the suit. Thus, the requirement of complete diversity had not
been satisfied.7 The suit proceeded in state court to final judgment
against both defendants.

GMC alone was granted a new trial. Again it filed a petition to re5. In Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 12, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 582 (1974),
the California appellate court recognized that as a result of the covenant, Prior was only a
nominal defendant who was retained "apparently to prevent removal of the cause by General Motors on diversity grounds." Id.
The court explained further that the "plaintiffs' obvious tactic was to minimize the
financial responsibility of Mr. Prior and to emphasize that of General Motors," even though
Prior was "the obviously liable defendant" and General Motors "the debatably liable defendant." Id. at 13-14, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
The plaintiffs cause of action arose when Prior, who was driving under the influence of
alcohol and drugs, hit the plaintiffs car, which was stopped on the side of the freeway with a
flat tire. The impact knocked the car off the shoulder of the road, at which time the gas tank
ruptured and the car caught fire. Two people were killed and two others were severely
injured. The plaintiff attempted to establish a products liability case against GMC.
By signing the covenant with Prior, the plaintiff was virtually assured of recovering the
amount of Prior's liability insurance yet was able to retain Prior as a defendant, thus
preventing diversity. Further, the plaintiff, having agreed not to collect any judgment she
might receive from the jury above the insurance amount, avoided the necessity of emphasiz-

ing Prior's liability to the jury.
6. No. 75-1572, slip op. at 1053. Unless the plaintiff fails to state a cause of action against
the defendant and under settled state law it is obvious that no cause of action can be stated,
joinder is not fraudulent. See cases cited in 1A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.161 [2], at
212 n.5 (2d ed. 1978). A fraudulently joined defendant maybe ignored in determining diversity. See Parks v. New York Times Co., 308 F.2d 474, 476-79 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 949 (1964). However, if there is any possibility that the plaintiff has stated a cause
of action against the resident defendant, the joinder will not be deemed fraudulent. See
Note, The Effect ofSection 1446(b) on the Nonresident'sRight to Remove, 115 U. PA. L. REv.
264, 264 n.5 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Nonresident'sRight]. A defective statement of the
plaintiff's cause of action or joinder of a judgment-proof defendant is not proof of fraudulent joinder. See Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Schwyhart, 227 U.S. 184, 193-94 (1913); Viles
v. Sharp, 248 F. Supp. 271, 272 (W.D. Mo. 1965).
7. It has long been established that a case is not removable if any plaintiff is a citizen of
the same state as any defendant in the suit. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267
(1806).
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move, arguing that the final disposition against Prior eliminated him
from the suit and that complete diversity existed. The district court
remanded again, ruling that before Prior's dismissal would be considered final, the state appellate process had to be exhausted.
The California Court of Appeal then heard appeals from both GMC
and Smith which, once ruled upon, left the trial court's decision undisturbed. The California Supreme Court refused to hear the case. With
the state appellate process thus complete, GMC successfully removed
the new trial to federal court. Smith appealed to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, challenging the district court's action in permitting
removal in the absence of a voluntary act by the plaintiff dismissing the
resident defendant.
III.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE

The voluntary-involuntary rule is a simple one. If diversity is created as a result of a voluntary act by.the plaintiff, then the diverse defendant is allowed to remove. If, however, dismissal of the resident
defendant is the result of a court order or other action not voluntarily
undertaken by the plaintiff, then removal is improper.
The rule had its genesis in early cases which developed to fill a statutory gap. An early version of the removal statute' provided that a motion to remove could be filed "at the time, or any time before the
defendant is required by the laws of the State or the rule of the State
court in which such suit is brought to answer" the plaintiffs complaint.9 Not only did this statute result in a variety of times for filing,
since the rules in each state varied greatly,"° but it ignored situations in
which diversity only occurred some time after the initial complaint was
filed, or after the proceeding had begun. In Powers v. Chesapeake &
Ohio Railway, I the Supreme Court addressed this issue.
Powers was the first case to present the Court with the issue of removal by a diverse defendant following the dismissal of all resident
defendants which occurred after the expiration of the time prescribed
for answering the complaint. Although the facts in Powers revealed a
voluntary dismissal by the plaintiff, the Court did not make the voluntary-involuntary distinction. Instead, the Court focused on the time period for filing removal petitions, holding that the statutory time limit
8. Judiciary Act of 1911, ch. 231, § 29, 36 Stat. 1095 (current version 28 U.S.C. § 1446
(1976)).
9. Id.
10. 1A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.168 [3.-5], at 468, 469 n.7 (2d ed. 1974).
11. 169 U.S. 92 (1898).
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could not be literally applied and, therefore, that a diverse defendant
should be allowed to remove after "the action assumes the shape of a

removable case in the court in which it was brought."'

2

Hence, in

Powers, plaintiffs delay in dismissing the resident defendants did not
defeat the diverse defendant's right to remove.
In Whitcomb v.Smithson,13 decided two years after Powers, the
Court did make the voluntary-involuntary distinction and held that the
dismissal of the resident defendant must be the result of a voluntary act
by the plaintiff in order to render a suit removable.' 4 Thus, a directed
verdict for the resident defendant in Whitcomb did not make the action
removable. Subsequent cases at both the Supreme Court and lower
court levels solidified the rule by following Whitcomb and treating the
voluntary nature of the dismissal as the crucial consideration.'- Dismissals by summary judgment,' 6 by demurrer to the evidence,' 7 and on
the defendant's motion' s were consistently held to be involuntary in
nature.
In 1949, the removal procedure statute' 9 was amended to allow a

defendant to remove within twenty days of the date on which grounds
for removal first become apparent. 20 The amendment does not specifically mention the voluntary-involuntary rule. This omission initially
12. Id. at 101.
13. 175 U.S. 635 (1900).
14. Id. at 638.
15. See, e.g., American Car & Foundry Co. v. Kettelhake, 236 U.S. 311 (1915) (involuntary nonsuit, not removable); Henly v. Community Natural Gas Co., 24 F.2d 252 (N.D. Tex.
1928) (directed verdict, not removable). See also Fogarty v. Southern Pac. Co., 121 F. 941
(S.D. Cal. 1903) (removal permitted following voluntary dismissal of resident defendant by
plaintiff; voluntary-involuntary distinction not discussed).
16. See, e.g., Saylor v. General Motors Corp., 416 F. Supp. 1173 (E.D. Ky. 1976).
17. See, e.g., Kansas City Suburban Belt Ry. v. Herman, 187 U.S. 63 (1902).
18. See, e.g., Squibb-Mathieson Int'l Corp. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 238 F. Supp. 598
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1976). See note 20 infra for text in part.
20. Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 83, 63 Stat. 101. The twenty-day period was changed
to thirty days by the Act of Sept. 29, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-215, 79 Stat. 887. The statute, in
relevant part, reads:
(b) The petition for removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within thirty
days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the
initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is
based, or within thirty days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such
initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the
defendant, whichever period is shorter.
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a petition for removal may
be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise,
of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first
be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.
Id.
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wrought a number of conflicting approaches to this aspect of removal.21
A majority of the courts, however, soon resolved to interpret the

amendment as a congressional affirmation of the judicially developed
rule.2 2

Courts have adopted two approaches in applying the voluntary-involuntary rule. The majority in Self illustrates the formalistic approach. This approach utilizes neat categories of "voluntary" and
"involuntary" and frequently results in summary dispositions of those

cases which fall into a voluntary or involuntary category.2 3 Other

21. Nonresident's Right, supra note 6, at 267. One approach treats the amendment as
superseding the voluntary-involuntary rule; another treats the amendment as codifying the
rule; a third interprets the amendment as merely a procedural law which does not speak to
the issue of what renders a case removable. Id. at 267-71.
22. See Weems v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 380 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1967), in which the court
rejected the argument that the voluntary-involuntary rule did not survive the 1949 amendment. The Weems court discussed Lyon v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 228 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Miss.
1964), one of the few cases which treated the rule as having been abolished by the amendment. The Weems court criticized the Lyon court for failing to consider the significance of
the legislative history of the amendment. The history indicated that the amendment was
"declaratory of the existing rule laid down by the decisions" and cited Powers as an illustration of that rule. H.R. Rep. No. 352, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1248, 1268 (1949).
23. Inevitably, however, fact situations arise which are more obscure and difficult to categorize. For example, in Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534 (1939), a plaintiff brought suit
in state court against a diverse defendant and its employee, who was fictitiously named in
the complaint and whose citizenship was not alleged. The controversy involving the diverse
defendant was not separable from that involving the Doe defendant. When plaintiff failed
to serve the Doe defendant, the diverse defendant attempted to remove the case. The Court
held that the plaintiffs failure to serve process on the Doe defendant did not justify the
removal. The Court presumed that the Doe defendant was a resident of the same state as
the plaintiff. It placed the burden on the diverse defendant to prove otherwise, that is, to
prove that the controversy was "wholly between citizens of different states."
In Southern Pac. Co. v. Haight, 126 F.2d 900 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 676 (1942),
plaintiff sued a diverse railroad and two resident Doe employees who were not served. The
court held that the plaintiff, by electing to proceed on the day of the trial in spite of the lack
of service upon the resident defendants, committed the voluntary act necessary to render the
suit removable. The "act" was the election to proceed when the state court asked the plaintiff if she wanted to begin trial. The failure to serve was merely a voluntary omission and
alone did not qualify as a voluntary act, according to the court.
On the other hand, although failure to serve process may be only a voluntary omission not
rendering the suit removable, in New England Oil & Pipe Line Co. v. Broyles, 87 Okla. 55,
209 P. 312 (1922) plaintiff's failure to appear and the subsequent default judgment for the
resident defendant together did constitute a voluntary "act" by the plaintiff, and removal by
the diverse defendant was allowed.
In Halsey v. Minnesota-South Carolina Land & Timber Co., 54 F.2d 933 (E.D.S.C. 1932),
the court was faced with the situation of a resident defendant who died while the litigation
was in progress. The court held that plaintiff had not voluntarily dismissed the defendant
and removal was denied.
In Kincheloe v. Hopkins, 4 F. Supp. 196 (N.D. Okla. 1933) the resident defendants successfully demurred and plaintiffs requested a new trial against the diverse defendants only.
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courts, as well as the dissent in Self, advocate an approach, which
24
views judicial efficiency as the substantive rationale behind the rule:
the rule "promotes judicial efficiency by 'prevent[ing] removal of those
cases in which the issue of the resident defendant's dismissal has not
been finally determined in the state courts.' "25
The dissent in Se//explained the mechanics of the rule which result
in efficient judicial administration. Generally, a voluntary dismissal
occurs prior to commencement of trial. Removal at this point in time
does not involve the risk of duplication of proceedings. In addition,
because of its voluntariness, the dismissal is certain to be conclusive,
and there is no risk that a diversity-destroying defendant will be reinstated later on appeal. z6
Conversely, dismissals by court order or by other acts which are involuntary as to the plaintiff usually occur after commencement of trial.
Removal at this point results in a duplication of the part of the proceedings already accomplished and the risk that on a successful appeal
by the plaintiff, the resident defendant will be reinstated and the federal court will be divested of its jurisidiction over the case. Further, the
removal of the case to federal court would cut off any right to appeal of
the resident defendant since the state court is deprived of power to act
after removal.2 7

IV.

REASONING OF THE COURT

Upon review of the district court's finding that the suit was removable on the basis of diversity, the court of appeals in Se/f reversed and
remanded the case to the district court. The appellate court concluded
that resident defendant.Prior had not been dismissed from the case by a
voluntary act of the plaintiff and, thus, that the prerequisite to removal
under the voluntary-involuntary rule had not occurred.2 8 Addressing
The court denied removal because an appeal was pending against the resident defendants on
the issue of the demurrer. The denial turned on the involuntary nature of the demurrer,
ignoring the voluntary act of requesting a new trial against only the diverse defendants.
24. No. 75-1572, slip op. at 1055. See Bumgardner v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 432 F.
Supp. 1289 (D.S.C. 1977); Saylor v. General Motors Corp., 416 F. Supp. 1173 (E.D. Ky.
1976); Ennis v. Queen Ins. Co. of America, 364 F. Supp. 964 (W.D. Tenn. 1973).
25. No. 75-1572, slip op. at 1055 (citing Weems v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 380 F.2d 545, 546
(5th Cir. 1967) (discussed in note 22 supra)).
26. Id. at 1058-59 (Ely, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 1059-60 (Ely, J., dissenting). The dissent noted further that although the diverse
defendant may attempt to remove after the period in which the resident defendant may
appeal has elapsed, removal at this point would necessitate inefficient repetition of the evidence.
28. Id. at 1057.
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the district court's initial remand of the case, the court noted that a

reversal of the decision that the covenant not to execute judgment did
not constitute a voluntary dismissal of Prior was prevented by the federal rules because the lower court's decision was not clearly erroneous.

29

The court contended that the Powers-Whitcomb line of cases, which
developed the voluntary-involuntary rule with respect to removal by
diversity, is analogous to the line of cases which addressed the issue of

removability on federal question grounds, a line of cases headed by the

decision in Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley.30 The Mottley

rule reaffirmed the general rule that jurisdiction is conferred upon a
federal court only if the plaintiff's pleadings reveal a cause of action
based on the laws or the Constitution of the United States. Further, the
Court held in Mottley that if the plaintiff, in his complaint, anticipates
a defense and asserts that such defense is invalid under federal law, the
federal question is not an integral part of the plaintiffs cause of action
and removal must be denied. 1
The Self majority cited two cases in particular to support its contention that, just as Supreme Court decisions bind lower courts to a formalistic rule regarding federal question removal, so do the decisions
bind them in diversity removal cases. In Great Northern Railway v.
Alexander,32 although the parties were diverse at commencement of
the suit, removal was prevented by the plaintiff's allegation that the suit
involved Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) provisions. 33 Plain29. Id. at 1053 n.2 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 52a which states, in relevant part: "In all actions
tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury... [flindings of fact shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . .") As stated by the court in Graves v. Walton
County Bd. of Educ., 410 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1969), the clearly erroneous standard for appellate review is a strict one. A finding of fact cannot be set aside merely because a reviewing court disagrees with the lower court's conclusion or construction of the facts, when there
is evidence to support the lower court's finding. However, a finding is clearly erroneous
when, after considering the evidence, a reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, that the evidence supporting the finding was
inadequate, or that the lower court's action was prompted by an erroneous view of the law.
See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948); Arkansas Valley Feed
Mills, Inc. v. Fox De Luxe Foods, Inc., 273 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1960). The rule applies to
findings of fact, but a mixed finding of fact and law is subject to review free from the clearly
erroneous rule. See Ashland Oil and Ref. Co. v. Kenny Constr. Co., 395 F.2d 683 (6th Cir.
1968) (holding that the question of whether plaintiff sustained his burden of proving defendant's blasting operations caused alleged damage was mixed question of law and fact).
30. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
31. Id. at 152.
32. 246 U.S. 276 (1918).
33. The Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976), governs actions
against a railroad employer by an employee if the employee is injured while the railroad is
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tiff subsequently failed to prove facts which would have brought the
suit under the FELA. Defendant attempted to remove on the basis of
diversity, arguing that the suit then stood as if the FELA allegations
had never been made. The Supreme Court held that removal was improper because the allegations of the complaint showed a nonremovable cause of action. "[T]he plaintiff may by the allegations of his
complaint determine the status with respect to removability of a case,
"
arising under a law of the United States ....
In Alabama Great Southern Railway v' Thompson,35 the plaintiff
brought suit against a diverse railroad and a resident individual defendant. The railroad removed on the grounds that the suit against it
was a separable controversy. The Supreme Court held that, although it
was unlikely that the plaintiff could recover jointly, "the right to remove depend[s] upon the case made in the complaint . . .. " The
complaint itself did not state a "separable controversy wholly between
citizens of different States." Thus, plaintiff's cause of action was
treated as a joint one for removal purposes, irrespective of whether or
not it7 was later shown that the plaintiff had no right to a joint recover-y.

3

Both Great Northern, a case arising under the laws of the United
States, and Alabama, a case involving diversity removal, reiterate the
principle of Mottley and its progeny that the plaintiff's pleadings are
determinative for removal purposes. The plaintiff controls the proceedings by his allegations even when the defendant offers proof contrary to
39
such allegations 38 or contradicts such allegations in his answer.
Apparently on the basis of similar language and reasoning, the majority in Self used Great Northern and Alabama to illustrate the "common origins" of the Mottley and Powers lines of authority,40 and it
concluded that the voluntary-involuntary rule applies in the same for41
malistic fashion as the Mottley rule.
In addition to supporting its opinion with the Mottley analogy, the
engaging in interstate commerce. Section 56 sets forth the specific forums in which the
plaintiff may bring the action. Further, 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (1976) prohibits removal of a state
action brought against a railroad under the Act. Chacon v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 320
F.2d 331 (10th Cir. 1963).
34. 246 U.S. at 282.
35. 200 U.S. 206 (1906).
36. Id. at 217.
37. Id. at 218-19.
38. Great Northern Ry., 246 U.S. at 281.
39. Alabama Great S. Ry., 200 U.S. at 218-19.
40. No. 75-1572, slip op. at 1056.
41. Id. at 1055-56.
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Self majority defended its stand by asserting the demise of the efficiency/finality rationale.4 2 Although that rationale is recognized by
some lower courts, it was rejected by the Supreme Court in Lathrop,
Shea & Henwood Co. v. Interior Construction & Improvement Co." In
Lathrop, the Court denied removal in accordance with the voluntaryinvoluntary rule, even though the state appellate process had been exhausted. The Court thereby implicitly rejected the efficiency/finality
rationale.
Judge Ely, in a footnote to his dissent in Self, dismissed the significance of the Lathrop opinion:
The Supreme Court's decision in Lathrop . . . is rather obscure on the
issue of whether the state appellate process had been completed with respect to plaintiffs appeal of the dismissal of the resident defendant. At
least three commentators have viewed the holding of this decision, that
removal was improper, as ultimately resting on plaintiffs right of state
appellate review, a right that had not yet been exhausted.'
Judge Ely criticized the majority's mechanical and formalistic application of the rule to the facts in Sef. He contended that the facts warranted an approach sensitive to the underlying rationale of the rule.
Judge Ely argued that the language in American Car & Foundry Co. v.
Kettelhake45 "indicates that the voluntary-involuntary doctrine is only
46
a rough vehicle of convenience to determinefinalityof the dismissal"'
He reasoned that only where efficiency and comity are of overriding
concern should the voluntary-involuntary rule be invoked to deny removal. "Repetition of the shibboleth after the need for it has evaporated elevates the imperfect vehicle over the policies it is designated to
carry. The nonresident defendant's right to a federal forum is frustrated for no good reason."'4 7
42. See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
43. 215 U.S. 246 (1909).
44. No. 75-1572, slip op. at 1061 n.7 (Ely, J., dissenting). See Removal ofSuits, supra note
4, at 962 & n.21; Note, FederalPractice:Removal After Resident Defendant Is Involuntarily
Dismissed, 17 OKLA. L. REv. 336, 337 (1964); Nonresident'sRight, supra note 6, at 266 &
n.13.
45. 236 U.S. 311 (1915).
46. No. 75-1572, slip op. at 1061 (Ely, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The language of
Kettelhake to which Judge Ely referred includes a paragraph which reads:
[W]here there is a joint cause of action against defendants resident of the same State
with the plaintiff and a non-resident defendant, it must appear, to make the case a
removable one as to a non-resident defendant becuase of dismissal as to resident defendants, that the discontinuance as to such defendants was voluntary on the part of the
plaintif, and that such action has taken the resident defendants out of the case, so as to
leave a controversy wholly between theplaintjf and the non-residentdefendant.
Id. (quoting Kettelhake, 236 U.S. at 316 (emphasis added by Judge Ely)).
47. Id. at 1060.
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CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY'S POSITION

GMC argued that the formal voluntary-involuntary rule should be
relaxed. In response, the majority in Sepfnoted that if the court were
free to do so, it might be persuaded by the facts involved to modify the
rule and permit removal.4 8 The majority insisted, however, that the
court did not have such freedom and was "obliged to follow the formalistic approach adopted by the Supreme Court."4 9
The dissent disagreed, arguing that the voluntary-involuntary rule is
a flexible one and that, in light of the peculiar facts of Self, federal
jurisdiction may have been proper. A close examination of the majority's position, together with a review of Supreme Court cases which
expressly support the efficiency/finality rationale, reveals support for
the dissent's position.
4. Majority's Use of Supreme Court Authority
50
The majority relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in Lathrop,
construing it as a refutation of the efficiency/finality rationale. In that
case, the plaintiff sued a resident railroad and a diverse construction
company. A referee dismissed the case with respect to the railroad and
the dismissal was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of New York. After two unsuccessful attempts, the construction
company finally succeeded in removing to federal court, where the suit
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the construction company.5 1
The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed and remanded
the case, directing the lower court to remand to state court. The Court
stated that the removal itself had been improper because 2 of the invol5
untary nature of the dismissal of the railroad company.
The dissent in Se/f contended that the Lathrop opinion does not
make clear whether the state appellate process had been exhausted. 3
This contention, however, is not supported by a reading of the lower
court decisions. The second removal petition filed by the construction
company was denied because the appeal of the railroad's dismissal was
pending in state court.5 4 By granting the construction company's third
48. Id. at 1057 n.6.
49. Id.

50. See notes 43 & 44 supra and accompanying text.
51. Lathrop, Shea & Henwood Co. v. Interior Constr. & Improvement Co., 150 F. 666
(C.C.W.D.N.Y. 1907).
52. 215 U.S. at 249-51.
53. See note 44 sufpra and accompanying text.
54. Lathrop, Shea & Henwood Co. v. Interior Constr. & Improvement Co., 143 F. 687
(C.C.W.D.N.Y. 1906).
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petition to remove, the federal court implied that it was satisfied that
the appellate process had been completed. The Supreme Court, in reversing, clearly relied upon the involuntary nature of the dismissal of
the resident defendant, not upon any lack of finality. 5
A more valid criticism of the Self majority's position involves the
extent to which it relied upon Lathrop. The majority failed, as the dissent pointed out, to review equally pertinent pre- and post-Lathrop authority bearing on the question of the Supreme Court's approach to the
voluntary-involuntary rule. In Yulee v. Vose,56 for example, the plaintiff, a citizen of New York, sued Yulee, a citizen of Florida, and various
New York residents. The complaint was dismissed as to all the defendants. The New York Court of Appeals reversed as to Yulee and remanded his case for a new trial. He then petitioned for removal to
federal court. In ruling on the propriety of the removal, the Supreme
Court declared that "the controversy, so far as it concerned Yulee, not
only could be, but actually had been by judicial determination, separated from that of the other defendants. This. . . gave Yulee a right to
the transfer of his part of the suit to the [federal] Court. . ... 17 Thus,

Yulee is an example of removal after an involuntary dismissal of the
resident defendant, and after the completion of the appellate process.
Of course, Yulee, decided twenty years prior to Powers,58 is not,
standing alone, very persuasive when considered in light of the great
volume of cases supporting the Powers-Whitcomb rule.5 9 It is fair to
say that, despite any position of importance Yulee may have had, 60 it
has been superseded by the Powers line of cases. Nevertheless, the
Yulee decision remains significant in that its spirit, if not its exact letter,
was reiterated by the Supreme Court in post-Powers cases such as
American Car & Foundry Co. v. Kettelhake.6 ' The Court in Kettelhake

denied removal when the resident defendants were dismissed by an involuntary nonsuit. However, the Supreme Court noted that "the resident defendants had not 'so completely disappeared from the case as to
55. 215 U.S. at 249-51.

56. 99 U.S. 539 (1879).
57. Id. at 546.
58. See notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text.
59. See notes 11-18 supra and accompanying text.
60. Yulee has been cited in few cases. See, e.g., Parks v. New York Times Co., 195 F.
Supp. 919 (M.D. Ala. 1961), rev'd, 308 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949
(1964); Stonybrook Tenants Ass'n v. Alpert, 194 F. Supp. 552 (D. Conn. 1961); Mayor of
Baltimore v. Weinberg, 190 F. Supp. 140 (D. Md. 1961).
61. 236 U.S. 311 (1915). See also Kansas City Suburban Belt Ry. v. Herman, 187 U.S. 63
(1902) (discussing the prerequisites to removal, particularly the requirement that the controversy be wholly between citizens of different states).
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leave the controversy one entirely between the plaintiff and a non-resident. .
"62 The appeal as to the resident defendants was pending.
Thus, declared the Court, "The element upon which the decision in the
Powers Case depended,-the voluntary dismissal and consequent conclusion of the suit in the state court as to resident defendants,-is not
present in this case."6 3
On the basis of Keltelhake, one may conclude that the Court in
Lathrop had not conclusively rejected finality as an important factor in
its approach to the rule. Notwithstanding the assertion of the majority
in Sef,this factor has continued to play a role in federal court decisions up to the present time.'
'

B. Majority's Analogy to Mottley

The majority supported its position by drawing an analogy between
the voluntary-involuntary rule and the Mottley rule.6" Having drawn

this analogy, the majority concluded that the voluntary-involuntary
rule must be applied in the same formalistic manner that has characterized applications of the Mo/l/ey rule.66 Although the majority's "com-

mon origins" theory is supportable, its conclusion is not convincing.
The Mottley principles have not been as rigidly applied as the majority in Sefasserts. The courts have been cognizant of the need to strike
a balance between the policy of permitting a plaintiff to control the
proceedings and the defendant's right to be heard in a federal forum.
Fairness to both parties requires that a court determine the real nature

of the claim asserted in the complaint. 67 Thus, for example, in causes
of action over which jurisdiction is vested exclusively in the federal
courts, the federal court will ignore the plaintiff's pleadings and permit
removal when the plaintiff has wrongly characterized his cause of ac62. 236 U.S. at 316. See note 46 supra.
63. Id. at 317. The language quoted is so imprecise that both the dissent and the majority
in Self could rely on it. The Supreme Court stated that the one "element" on which Powers
turned was missing in Kettelhake. However, the Court went on to describe this element as
"the voluntary dismissal and consequent conclusion of the suit." (emphasis added). A reading of the two opinions in Se/freveals that modern courts regard "voluntary dismissal" and
"conclusion of the suit" as two elements.
64. See, e.g., Bumgardner v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 1289, 1291 (D.S.C.
1977); Saylor v. General Motors Corp., 416 F. Supp. 1173, 1175 (E.D. Ky. 1976); Ernis v.
Queen Ins. Co. of America, 364 F. Supp. 964, 965 (W.D. Tenn. 1973); Continental Oil Co. v.
PPG Indus., Inc., 355 F. Supp. 1183, 1185 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
65. See notes 30-41 supra and accompanying text.
66. No. 75-1572, slip. op. at 1056.
67. See Clinton v. Hueston, 308 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1962).
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tion.6 8 The court will allow the removal petition to supplement the
plaintiff's pleadings for the purpose of establishing the federal question.6 9
There are other situations in which the court will look beyond the

plaintiff's complaint to determine removability. In the case of fraudulent joinder of parties, the court cannot confine its examination to the
plaintiff's pleadings inasmuch as the pleadings are the very thing in
question.70
Obviously, the fact that removal is permitted after commencement of

a suit prevents courts from rigidly interpreting the rule to mean that
only the allegations of the complaint are relevant for determining removal. 7' The rule must at least be flexible enough to include amended

pleadings.
In practice, as even the Self majority concedes, courts might not look

to the pleadings at all, but rather to "the context in which they are
found" in determining removability. 72 In Southern Pacfic Co. v.

Haight,73 for example, the plaintiff never formally amended her pleadings to indicate a dismissal of the resident Doe defendants. The fact

that the pleadings included such defendants, plaintiff argued, defeated
diversity. The court, however, allowed removal on the basis of her act
of announcing her willingness to proceed at the time of trial against the
68. See La Chemise Lacoste v. Alligator Co., 313 F. Supp. 915 (D. Del. 1970), rev'd on
other grounds, 506 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 937 (1975); Ulichny v.
General Elec. Co., 309 F. Supp. 437 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Hearst Corp. v. Shopping Center
Network, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
69. See Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
70. See, e.g., Smoot v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. Co., 378 F.2d 879,' 881-83 (10th Cir.
1967) (court may look beyond pleadings to determine if joinder, though-fair on the face of
the complaint, is a sham to prevent removal); McLeod v. Cities Service Gas Co., 233 F.2d
242, 246 (10th Cir. 1956) (may show fraudulent joinder by any means available if proved
with certainty). But see Bohanan v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 289 F. Supp. 490 (W.D.
Okla. 1968) (if the joinder was fraudulent, that fact was or should have been apparent to
defendant from face of plaintiff's complaint; knowledge subsequently acquired by deposition was of no consequence in determining removability).
71. See, e.g., Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 251 F.2d 412,
414-16 (8th Cir. 1958) (for purposes of determining whether separate and independent claim
exists, rule limiting examination to "plaintiffs pleadings" does not mean to "plaintiff's complaint," unless only a complaint has been filed; time for removing runs from date of plaintiff's replies).
72. No. 75-1572, slip op. at 1057. Accord, Landmark Tower Assocs. v. First Nat'l Bank of
Chicago, 439 F. Supp. 195, 196 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (the district court "should be guided by the
principle that 'in practice, the federal courts usually do not limit their inquiry to the face of
plaintiff's complaint, but rather consider the facts disclosed on the record as a whole in
determining the propriety of removal.' ") (quoting Villarreal v. Brown Express, Inc., 529
F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1976)).
73. 126 F.2d 900 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 676 (1942).
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diverse defendant, without having served the Doe defendants. The
court viewed her election to proceed as, in effect, a dismissal of such
defendants.74 Thus, the court clearly looked beyond the plaintiff's
pleadings to find diversity.
If the majority in Sef had recognized the flexibility it is afforded in
applying the voluntary-involuntary rule, and had reviewed the context
in which the elimination of the resident defendant, occurred, it might
have avoided a "continued wooden adherence"7 to a rule-the application of which was not justified by the facts. Although Prior, the resident defendant, was still named in the complaint as a defendant, he
had actually been eliminated from the suit as a result of the final judgment against him and the covenant not .to execute judgment.
C

Review of the Covenant

The majority in Se/f declared that rule 52a of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure,76 which precludes full review of a finding of fact unless such finding is clearly erroneous, prevented a full review of the
district court's decision that Prior remained a party to the action
notwithstanding the covenant not to execute judgment given to him by
plaintiff. It is not altogether clear, however, that such a question is
purely one of fact.77 Certainly the question whether a covenant was

signed is one of fact. But the legal effect of a covenant on the status of
the parties thereto perhaps best fits within a murky category identified
78
by one commentator as "the product of applying law to fact."
Unfortunately, "both federal and state cases clash hopelessly in classifying law application by a trial judge as a factual or legal matter ...
[E]ven single circuits, ignoring conflict in their own opinions, have applied Rule 52(a) inconsistently. .
Ninth Circuit.

'79

.

. This is particularly true of the

Had the court of appeals fully reviewed the issue of the covenant, it
74. Id. at 902-05.
75. No. 75-1572, slip op. at 1060.
76. See note 29 supra.
77. If the question is not purely one of fact, it is not subject to the clearly erroneous
restriction and may be reviewed. See note 29 supra.
78. Weiner, The CivilNonjury Trialand the Law-Fact Distinction,55 CALIF. L. REV. 1020,
1056 (1967).
79. Id. at 1022-23 & n.26 (footnotes omitted). Further, Weiner warns that "the appellate
court may simply declare, without further comment, that the question is one of law or one of
fact. Presumably, if the court feels that a trial judge's determination should be reversed, it
will classify it as a legal conclusion, thereby making reversal easier." Id. at 1022 (footnotes
omitted). Conversely, if the legal conclusion is called a finding of fact, the appellate court
can avoid deciding legal issues when it agrees with the result of the trial. Id. at 1022 & n.20.
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probably would have concluded that the district court was correct in

deciding that the covenant alone did not constitute a voluntary dismissal. However, had the appellate court followed the approach taken in
Southern Pacfic Co. v. Haight,8 ° and examined the context of the
diversity issues before them, it might have held that the covenant, in

conjunction with the final judgment against Prior, did constitute a voluntary dismissal.8
In the recent case of Bumgardner v. Combustion Engineering,Inc. ,82 a
federal district court ruled that the dismissal of a resident defendant by
a covenant which becomes final, permits removal by the remaining diverse defendant. There, the court allowed removal after a covenant not

to execute judgment was given by the plaintiff to the resident defendant. The court held that the settlement constituted a voluntary discon-

tinuance of the action against that defendant. The court cited Gable v.
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul& Pacfc Railroad 3 as persuasive au-

thority. Gable involved a similar settlement between the plaintiff and
the resident defendant.84 In holding that removal was proper after

such a voluntary act by the plaintiff, the court concluded that "there is
no difference between extinguishing a controversy by a voluntary dismissal in court and extinguishing it by a settlement of the controversy

out of court. Indeed, the settlement even more finally extinguishes the
controversy than the dismissal."8 " In Se/f, although there was a judgment on the merits, all avenues of appeal had been exhausted and, as a
result of the covenant, the finality of the case against Prior was conclu-

sively established. As stated in the dissent, "Prior's continued joinder
[was] a sham and should [have been] ignored in determining diver80. 126 F.2d 900 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 676 (1942). See notes 73-74 supra and
accompanying text.
81. This would not be unlike situations in which a diverse defendant and the plaintiff
stipulate to the joinder of a resident defendant. Because the diverse defendant has agreed to
the joinder, he cannot be heard to complain that diversity has been destroyed. See IA
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTIcE 0.161[l], at 209 (2d ed. 1978). Similarly, the plaintiff who
executes and obtains the benefits of a covenant not to execute judgment should not be allowed to complain when, as a result, diversity between the genuinely interested parties is
created.
82. 432 F. Supp. 1289 (D.S.C. 1977).
83. 8 F. Supp. 944 (W.D. Mo. 1934).
84. The document signed in Gable was a covenant not to sue which, the Bumgardner
court held, has the same legal effect as a covenant not to execute judgment. 432 F. Supp. at
1292.
85. 8 F. Supp. at 946. The court in Gable cautioned that it is not enough to show that a
settlement exists because a settlement can always be contested. Rather, the party seeking
removal must present clear and convincing proof that the settlement is binding and final.
Id. at 946-47.
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D.

Unspoken Rationale Underlying Majority's Position

The issue of the covenant never arose, however, because the court,
while indicating its misgivings in this case,87 adhered to a formalistic

approach to the rule. The apparent weaknesses of the majority's argument that it was strictly bound by Supreme Court authority to act as it
did88 suggest that there were other unspoken factors which tipped the
scale in the plaintiffs favor in the balancing of competing policies. 9
Judge (now Justice) Blackmun wrote inBradley v. Maryland Casualty

Co." that the court "recognize[s] that there may be a trend toward
restriction, rather than enlargement, of federal diversity jurisdiction
...and that removal statutes are to be strictly construed" against federal jurisdiction.9"
Although the judicial interest in restricting diversity jurisdiction remained unexpressed in Self, another court focused on it in Ennis v.
Queen Insurance Co. of America.9 2 In Ennis, although removal was

allowed in light of a fraudulent joinder, the court indicated that it was
unsympathetic to the voluntary-involuntary rule, a rule which, in the
interests of restricting diversity jurisdiction, prevents removal even in
factual situations in which judicial efficiency is not furthered by an application of the rule.9 3

The current discussion in the legal community and Congress regarding the restriction of diversity jurisdiction focuses on several considerations, including heavily congested federal court trial dockets. 94
86. No. 75-1572, slip op. at 1062. See also Gable v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul &
Pacific R.R., 8 F. Supp. at 945 ("A controversy which has ceased to exist is certainly as much
a sham controversy as one which was always fictitious.").
87. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
88. See text accompanying note 49 supra. See also notes 50-86 supra and accompanying
text for a discussion of the weaknesses of the majority's argument.
89. See note 4 supra.
90. 382 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1967) (citing Shamrock Oil Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100
(1940)).
91. Id. at 419.
92. 364 F. Supp. 964 (W.D. Tenn. 1973).
93. Id. at 966. The court, however, recognized that the weight of authority supports a
formalistic approach to the rule. Id.
94. See American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 10-12 (1951) (removal requires a
"separate and independent claim or cause of action," and this test is to be applied rigidly in
furtherance of the congressional goals of limiting removals); Greenshields v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 61, 65 (10th Cir. 1957) ("Since Sec. 1441(c) was intended to restrict,
not enlarge, removal rights all doubts arising from defective, ambiguous and inartful pleadings should be resolved in favor of the retention of state court jurisdiction."); Young Spring
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Professor Moore noted in his treatise on federal practice:
It is . .. well to remember that the determination of the sufficiency of
defendants' compliance with the procedural provisions [of § 1446] is often
influenced by two factors: a desire on the part of some judges to avoid
further burdening their trial dockets;9 and the undeniable fact that to remand is usually safer than to retain. "
Understandably, a conservative approach to removal is called for in
certain situations. In Young Spring & Wire Corp. v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co.,96 the court explained, "[I]f removal is
permitted in a doubtful case and the defendant who removed suffers an
adverse judgment he may attack the removability of the case on appeal
and secure a reversal on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction of the District Court."9 7 Preventing such reversals is clearly a legitimate reason
for strictly construing removal statutes.
But the fact remains that the law affording a defendant a federal
forum has not yet been changed, and if the requirements of the statute
are met, the right to remove is absolute.9" The fact that the federal
courts are overburdened does not warrant the undermining of a federal
law by the judiciary. The district court should exercise care in protecting a party's statutory right to a federal forum, particularly in light of
present statutory law declaring that a district court's remand order is
99
not reviewable on appeal, except in certain civil rights cases.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The criticisms of the majority's approach in strictly adhering to the
voluntary-involuntary rule give rise to consideration of alternative approaches which would have more consistently reflected the policies
which underlie the rule, and which would have permitted federal jurisdiction on the facts presented.
& Wire Corp. v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 220 F. Supp. 222, 228 (W.D. Mo. 1963)
(citing increased jurisdictional amount and addition of subsection (c) to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as
further evidence of congressional intent to restrict diversity jurisdiction). See generally Bratton, Diversity Jurisdiction-4nIdea Whose Time Has Passed, 51 IND. L. REv. 347 (1976);
Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversiy Jurisdiction,41 HARv. L. REv. 483 (1928); H.
FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDiCrION: A GENERAL ViEW (1973); IA MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 0.157[13], at 158 (2d ed. 1978).
95. IA MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.168, at 445 (2d ed. 1978).
96. 220 F. Supp. 222 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
97. Id. at 228.
98. See Rubin v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 324 F. Supp. 204 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Ludwig Honold
Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 260 F. Supp. 917 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
99. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1976); McKay Packers v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 207 F.2d 955
(2d Cir. 1953).
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First, the court could have retained the rule in its strict form and,
nevertheless, could have held that removal was proper in that the execution of the covenant, together with the finality of the judgment
against Prior, was sufficient to support federal diversity jurisdiction.
Second, the court could have seized this opportunity to apply the rule
more flexibly, as the dissent in Seff suggested. A flexible approach
would allow federal diversity jurisdiction when it appears that considerations of efficiency and comity are satisfied. Under this approach, a
litigant's access to federal court would be protected except at the expense of efficiency. For example, removal might be denied when it
would result in the repetition of part of the state court proceedings.
The majority's position is clearly supported by the case law, which
reflects a rigid adherence to the voluntary-involuntary rule. The suggested alternatives are, admittedly, a departure from this rigid adherence. However, such a departure is supported by a minority of the
courts. Perhaps the court's failure to adopt a more flexible approach to
the rule might also indicate the absence of a judicial conviction that the
defendant in Sefwas entitled to a federal forum. Seen in this light the
conclusion of the majority and the absence of such a conviction may
best be understood in light of the current trend toward limiting diversity as a ground for federal jurisdiction.
Kim Elizabeth Wildman

